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Nature of the Case
This is Dale Carter Shackelford's consolidated appeal from a judgment, sentence
of death, and the partial denial of post-conviction relief from the District Court of the
Second Judicial District, Latah County. After a seven week trial, a jury found
Shackelford guilty of two counts of Murder in the First Degree and one count each of
Arson in the First Degree, Conspiracy to Commit Murder, Conspiracy to Commit Arson
and Preparing False Evidence. (R. 27966, Vol. 11, pp. 2223-2228) The district court
judge conducted an aggravation-mitigation hearing pursuant to former Idaho Code
§I9-2515.

This occurred prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

Therefore, the district court judge, without any input from the jury, found the
existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances, considered non-statutory
aggravating circumstances, and sentenced Shackelford to death for the murder
convictions.

The court also sentenced Shackelford to concurrent, fixed sentences of 25

years for arson, fixed life for conspiracy to commit murder, 25 years for conspiracy to
commit arson and 5 years for preparing false evidence. (R.27966, pp.3120-3126.)
Thereafter, Shackelford initiated post conviction proceedings.
While Shackelford's post conviction proceedings under Idaho's capital case
unitary review scheme were pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v.
Arizona, supra.. Ring held that allowing a sentencing judge, without the jury, to find an

aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty violated a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The District Court summarily
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denied all of Shackelford's post-conviction guilt phase claims, however, the district court
vacated Shackelford's death sentences pursuant to Ring. (R 31928, pp. 3579-3584).
Furthermore, because the district court granted sentencing relief pursuant to Ring, it did
not finally adjudicate Shackelford's post-conviction sentencing phase claims, finding
they were moot. (R. 31928, pp. 3628-3629).
The state has cross-appealed from the district court's grant of sentencing relief (
R. 31928, V. XVII, p. 3706). Therefore, Shackelford will defend the district court's
grant of sentencing relief in his Cross-Respondent's brief in response to the state's
cross-appeal. I.A.R. 34(c). This case comes to this Court in a rather unusual procedural
posture, occasioned by the timing of the Ring decision. Shackelford's sentencing claims,
both direct appeal and post-conviction, would be moot if the district court's grant of
sentencing relief is affirmed by this court.

Also, it is uncontroverted that Shackelford's

post conviction sentencing phase claims have not been finally adjudicated, which will
require a remand from this court in any event.

Therefore, in the interests of judicial

economy and effective use of resources, Shackelford will limit this Opening Appellant's
Brief to trial and post conviction guilt phase issues.

Shackelford will address specific

sentencing claims in his Cross-Respondent's Brief, should that be appropriate.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Dale Shackelford was indicted for the murders of his ex-wife, Donna Fontaine,
and her current boyfriend, Fred Pahluniuk, in a remote mountainous area of Latah
County known as Three Bear Road which occurred on or about May 29, 1999. The state
alleged that Shackelford conspired with Martha Millar, Bernadette Lasater, Mary Abitz,
Sonja Abitz, and, initially, John Abitz. Millar and Lasater had worked for Shackelford's
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business in Missouri, Shackelford Enterprises, an over the road trucking firm. The Abitz
family lived nearby in the Three Bear Road area. Sonja Abitz was Shackelford's fiance
at the time. John and Mary Abitz were Sonja's parents. All of the alleged conspirators
except for Shackelford' eventually pleaded guilty to charges related to the murders.
Millar and Lasater eventually cooperated with the state and testified at Shackelford's trial
in exchange for very lenient outcomes.
On Saturday, May 29, 1999, at 7:40 p.m., Latah County Sheriff Patrol Deputy
Richard Skiles was called to investigate a structure fire at 2168 Three Bear Road,
approximately thirty minutes outside the city limits of Kendrick, Idaho. (Tr., p.380, 1.9p.382, 1.8; p.383, Ls.3-12; p.ll05, 1.6.) When Skiles arrived at the scene, nearly an
hour later, he discovered several persons, including Gary Fontaine, who is Donna's
brother, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, Brian Abitz, Ted Meske, who is Mary Abitz's brother,
and Dale Shackelford, standing near a two-story garage that was completely engulfed in
flames. (Tr., p.391, 1.9 - p.392, 1.5.)
By the time the fire department arrived, the garage had been utterly destroyed,
having been reduced to little more than smoldering embers. Several hours later, after the
fire had been extinguished, two bodies were found in the rubble. (Tr., p.1340, 1.25 p.1343, 1.25.) The bodies were subsequently identified as the severely burned remains
of Donna Fontaine and Fred Pahluniuk. (Tr., p.2278, 1.5 - p.2281, 1.13; p.2294, 1.23 p.2295, 1.15; p.2319, Ls.5-10.)

At trial a state fire investigator testified that in his

opinion the fire was arson. (Tr. p. 1566, Ls. 7-11)

Charges against John Abitz were eventually dismissed.

1
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As of May 29, 1999, the garage belonged to Gary Fontaine and his niece, Shanna
Avery.

Shanna Avery is Donna Fontaine's daughter by a previous marriage. The

garage had previously been owned by Shackelford and Donna Fontaine during their
marriage.

A pickup truck belonging to Donna Fontaine was parked at the base of the

steep driveway to the garage, but when Skiles first arrived Donna's whereabouts were
unknown. (Tr., p.384, Ls.2-14; p.386, L.IO - p.387, L.7.)

Ms. Fontaine and Fred

Pahlnniuk had recently traveled together from Missouri to Idaho and had been seen
together earlier in the day at the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick, Idaho.
Dr. Cihak, the state's forensic pathologist, testified that Ms. Fontaine had died
from a gunshot wonnd to the neck and that she had also sustained a wound from shotgnn
pellets in her side. Cihak testified that Fred Pahluniuk had died from a gunshot wound
to tJie chest. Cihak opined that both Ms. Fontaine and Mr. Pahluniuk were dead before
their bodies were burned by the fire. (Tr. p. 2196, Ls. 3-4, p. 2215, Ls. 24-25) Dr. Cihak
also opined that Fred Pahliniuk had died between one half and three hours after he had
eaten a meai at the Locust Blossom festival.

(Tr. 2212 Ls 1-10) Cihak based this

opinion, which he referred to as a 'guesstimate', on Pahluniuk's stomach contents. This
assertion went unchallenged by Shackelford's trial attorneys. (Tr. 2212 Ls 1-10) Cihak
also determined and testified that based on the trajectory of the bullet wounds it was
unlikely that either Fontaine or Pahluniuk had committed suicide. (Tr 2196, 1 15- 19 )
Deputy Skiles testified at trial that it was Ted Meske who first mentioned the
possibility that there had been a suicide and who had advised Skiles that Fontaine might
have been in the fire. (Tr., p.392, Ls. 22-25; p.393, Ls.22-25; p.394, L.20 - p.396, L.55;
p.408, Ls.6-15.)

After talking to Meske, Skiles talked to Shackelford and asked
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Shackelford "what he thought the chances of there actually being a suicide in the fire".
According to Skiles, Shackelford responded that " he thought it could be good, but he
didn't want to say because he didn't know for sure." (Tr., p. 395, Ls. 13-14).

As will

be described more fully below, this exchange would later become the basis for the district
court's mistaken conclusion that Shackelford had injected the possibility of suicide as an
issue into the case and that therefore several hearsay statements of Ms. Fontaine were
admissible under the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule.
Concluding that Shackelford had injected the suicide theory into the case, the
district court permitted several witnesses to testifY to hearsay statements allegedly made
to them by Ms. Fontaine expressing her fear of Shackelford, some of which were made
years before, and others which were made months before Ms. Fontaine's death. Donald
Watkins, Philip Wadlow, Suzanne Ninichuck, Brian Raymond, Donald Boyle, and
Melinda Wadlow were allowed to testifY, over Shackelford's objection, to hearsay
statements allegedly made by Ms. Fontaine expressing her fear of Shackelford. These
witnesses' testimony will be described in greater detail below in the argument section of
this brief.
At trial, part of the state's theory was that Shackelford's motive to kill Ms.
Fontaine was the fact that Ms. Fontaine had accused Shackelford in a rape prosecution in
Missouri and was going to testifY accordingly. Ms. Fontaine was a practicing attorney in
Missouri.

Ms. Fontaine alleged that while the couple was married Shackelford had

raped her in Iron County, Missouri.

However, Ms. Fontaine did not make the rape

accusation against Shackelford for a year after the incident had allegedly occurred. (Tr.
4975, Ls. 11-14)

Ms. Fontaine also changed the date of the alleged rape after
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Shackelford had established an alibi and had established that Ms. Fontaine was in court
on the day of the alleged rape.

(Tr. p. 4977, Ls. 14-23) William Crocker testified that

in December of 1998, several months after the alleged rape, a woman who identified
herself to Crocker as Donna Fontaine had visited Shackelford while Shackelford was in
the hospital following an automobile accident. (Tr. p. 5081-82 )
Shackelford's Missouri attorney testified that Shackelford had a viable defense to
the rape charge based on Donna's delay in reporting the incident and on her differing
versions of when the crime had allegedly been committed. (Tr. p. 4977, Ls. 14-23) The
attorney further testified that because he had arranged to have the preliminary hearing on
the rape charge in Missouri transcribed, Donna's testimony had been preserved and that
Shackelford could still be prosecuted for the rape even if Donna were deceased at the
time of trial. (Tr. p. 4974, Ls. 12-16)
The state's version of the murders in Idaho was that Shackelford knew that
Donna and Fred had been at the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick, Idaho on May 29,
1999, and had laid in wait for them near the garage, ambushed her and Palahniuk,
attacked them at a distance by shotgun, shot them at close range by handgun, and finally,
burned the garage to destroy the evidence of his crime. (Tr., p.5277, Ls.l-5; p.5279, L.25
; p. 5280, L.3; p.5284, Ls.8-10; p.5976, Ls.l6-18.)

There was no direct evidence to

support the theory that it was Shackelford who committed the crime.

Despite the fact

that there was no direct evidence to establish that Shackelford-and not someone else--did
these things, the District Court refused to give the jury a Holder instruction limiting the
effect of circumstantial evidence.
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The case against Dale Shackelford was entirely circumstantial. There is no
physical evidence linking Shackelford to the crime scene. There are no witnesses placing
Shackelford at the crime scene at the time of the crime. Shackelford has never admitted
to anyone that he committed the crimes.

Shackelford immediately cooperated with the

authorities, made several voluntary statements to police prior to his arrest, voluntarily
testified before the grand jury and initiated an interview with police on August 18, 2000,
long after his arrest without knowledge of his counsel.
While Shackelford's various statements are admittedly not entirely consistent,
those statements are very consistent in the respect that Shackelford has never admitted
any involvement in the crimes, nor has he ever admitted being present when the crimes
were committed.

Shackelford has consistently maintained in all of his statements that

he was in Lewiston attending to his tractor trailer rig on May 29, 1999. No witness has
ever placed Shackelford at the scene of the crime during the relevant time frame.
Shackelford was arrested on Feb, 12, 2000. On August 18, 2000, Shackelford
initiated a meeting with Sgt. Earl Aston, the state's lead investigator in the case, at the
Latah County Jail. This conversation lasted several hours and was tape recorded. The
tape recording was admitted and played for the jury at trial. (Tr. Exhibits 196A,B,C and
D, Tr. p. 4063).

During this interview Shackelford told Aston that while he was in

Lewiston attending to the truck, he had a telephone conversation with Brian Abitz,
Sonja's teenage brother, in which Brian made statements to the effect that he had been
involved in a shootout with Donna and Fred at Three Bear. (Tr. 4187)
Jerry and Cindy Sutton had befriended Brian Abitz and allowed Brian to share
their campsite in the Three Bear Road area. (Tr. p. 4287-88). Jerry Sutton testified that
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Brian was known to have fireanns. (Tr. p. 4291, Ls. 2-10) The Suttons established that
Brian's whereabouts were unknown on the afternoon of May 29, 1999, and that Brian
seemed to know about the fire even before it had been reported.

(Tr. pp. 4294-4295, P

4230). Jerry Sutton testified that shortly after the Suttons returned from Lewiston on the
afternoon of May 29, 1999, Brian Abitz arrived at their camp. (Tr. p. 4294, Ls. 10-11) .
. Sutton testified that between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. Brian left their camp and said he "had to
go and help fight a fire".

(Tr. p. 4294, Ls. 13-14). Cindy Sutton testified that Brian

returned to their camp "probably before dusk", when he reported that there had been a
fire and that bodies were in the fire.

(Tr. p. 4319, Ls. 18-19, p. 4320, Ls. 2-4).

Jerry

Sutton testified that Brian also stated that "he figured it was Donna and her boyfriend"
who had been "trapped upstairs" in the fire. (Tr. p. 4295, Ls. 6-17).
After a nearly two month long jury tl;ial, the case was submitted to a sequestered
jury on December 21, 2000, just three days before the Christmas Holidays.
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

The jury

(R. 27966, pp. 2223) The district court

conducted a sentencing proceeding without a jury and sentenced Shackelford to death.
As noted above, the district court later vacated the death sentence.

Shackelford now

appeals from his convictions.
Post-Conviction Proceedings
On December 6, 2001, Mr. Shackelford timely filed his initial petition for postconviction relief. (R. 31928, pp.10-43.) The district court permitted several amendments
to the petition culminating in a final set of claims raised in Mr. Shackelford's Third
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R. 31928, pp.2534-2941; pp.2980-3033.)
On April 8, 2005, the district court granted in part the State's motion for summary
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dismissal. (R. 31928, pp.3586-3631.) The district court summarily dismissed all of Mr.
Shackelford's guilt phase claims, and some of his sentencing phase claims. However, the
district court granted summary relief to Shackelford on his claim that his death sentence
was unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). (R.31928, pp.35793584; p.3629.)

In particular, the district court held that the rule articulated in Ring

applies to the finding and weighing of mitigation evidence against the aggravation.
(R.31928, pp.3580-3584.) Because prior to Ring the jury did not make these prerequisite
findings for imposition of a death sentence in Idaho, the court vacated Mr. Shackelford's
death sentence. The State has appealed that decision. (R. 31928, p. 3607).
The district court also reserved ruling on Mr. Shackelford's claim that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by acquiescing to Mr. Shackelford's
wishes and failing to adequately investigate and present mitigation at sentencing.
(R.31928, pp.3628-3629.) The district court found these claims moot in light of the Ring
relief granted as to Shackelford's death sentence.

As guidance for counsel at

resentencing, the court cautioned that it now believed that control over the course of a
mitigation investigation necessarily rests with learned counsel, not the client. (R.31928,
p.3628 ("Counsel's obligation is independent of their client's desires so as to ensure that
the death penalty is not administered ,in a haphazard or arbitrary manner. ") Accordingly,
even if this Court were to reverse the district court's ruling granting Ring relief, this case
must be remanded following this and the state's cross appeal for a final adjudication of
Shackelford's remaining post-conviction claims.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING, DURING THE

STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF,

MULTIPLE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF DONNA

FONTAINE TO REBUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUICIDE WHERE THE STATE,
NOT SHACKELFORD, INJECTED THE ISSUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUICIDE
INTO THE CASE?
II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY

STATEMENTS OF SONJA AND MARY ABITZ.?
III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE
JURY A HOLDER INSTRUCTION LIMITING THE EFFECT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE?
IV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH LESSENED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF
AND PERMITTED A LESS THAN UNANIMOUS VERDICT?
V.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING

SHACKELFORD'S BRADY AND GIGLIO CLAIMS?
VI. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
CHOICE?
VII. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
SHACKLEFORD'S CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DUE TO LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS?
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VIII.

WHETHER

THE

DISTRICT

COURT

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE IN
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY IMPEACH STATE'S WITNESSES?
IX. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE IN
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE DEFENSE EXPERT WITNESSES?
X. CUMULATIVE ERROR
III. ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING, DURING THE STATE'S CASE

IN CHIEF,
REBUT

MULTIPLE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF DONNA FONTAINE TO

THE

POSSIBILITY

OF

SUICIDE

WHERE

THE

ST AtE,

NOT

SHACKELFORD, INJECTED THE ISSUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUICIDE INTO
THE CASE.
Standard of Review. When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, this Court
will defer to the factual findings of the district judge unless those findings are clearly
erroneous. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). This Court
exercises free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Id.
The interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed
de novo. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174,181 (1998)

However, the

decision to admit hearsay evidence under an exception is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Id. at 822, 965 P.2d at 182.
The district court erred in admitting, during the prosecution's case-in-chief, several
hearsay statements made by Ms. Fontaine to third parties expressing her fear of
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Shackelford.

Deputy Skiles testified that it was Ted Meske-not Shackelford--who

advised him that Fontaine might have been in the fire and who first mentioned the
possibility that there had been a suicide. (Tr., p.392, Ls. 22-25; p.393, Ls.22-25; p.394,
L.20 - p.396, L.55; pA08, Ls.6-15.)

Skiles then talked to Shackelford and asked

Shackelford "what he thought the chances of there actually being a suicide in the fire".
According to Skiles, Shackelford responded that " he thought it could be good, but he
didn't want to say because he didn't know for sure." (Tr., p. 395, Ls. 13-14). (emphasis
added).
The district court ruled that this exchange was sufficient to open the door to the
wholesale admission of hearsay evidence purportedly relating to Ms. Fontaine's state of
mind, although Shackelford did not even attempt to present the possibility of suicide as a
defense at trial. Thus the district court has permitted the prosecution to contrive a means
of admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay and to thereby bolster an entirely
circumstantial case. To compound this error, the district court failed to provide any
limiting instructions to the jury regarding the purpose for which the jury could consider
Donna Fontaine's hearsay statements.
Given that the case against Shackelford was entirely circumstantial, with a
dubious theory of Shackelford's motive, the admission of Ms. Fontaine's out of court
statements expressing her fears of Shackelford was highly prejudicial and the prejudicial
effect of such evidence substantially outweighed any probative value. A summary of the
hearsay statements of Donna Fontaine which the state was permitted to introduce during
the case in chief and over Shackelford's objections follows.
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The district court permitted Donald Watkins to testify to hearsay statements
allegedly made to him by Ms. Fontaine in July of 1997 and around Labor Day weekend
in 1997.

(Tr., p. 2004, 1.24 - p.2007, 1.15; p.2036, 1.12 - p.2038, 1.17.) These

statements attributed to Ms. Fontaine were made nearly two years prior to the crime.
Watkins described Ms. Fontaine's mental condition during those conversations, as "very,
very poor. She was crying and was having a very hard time" and "beyond hysterical."
(Tr., p.2005, Ls.21-22; p.2006, 1.9.)
Like most of the testimony purportedly related only to Donna's 'mental state',
Watkins' testimony went far beyond his mere observations of Donna's demeanor.
Watkins stated that Donna told him she was "scared to death" of Shackelford. (Tr.,
p.2007, Ls.8-14.)

The prosecution was repeatedly permitted during the case-in-chief,

over objection, nnder the guise of establishing foundation to elicit rank hearsay by
leading their witnesses through their testimony. An example of this is the following
excerpt from Watkins' testimony concerning a conversation he allegedly had with Ms.
Fontaine in September of 1997:
Q. Alright. When -- okay, I want to ask you now during the course of your

relationship with Donna you've already testified to the one telephone conversation
in the summer of 1997, but were there other times during the course of your
relationship with Donna Fontaine where she expressed fear in regard to the
defendant, Dale Shackelford?
MR. BARKER: Objection, foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
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A.

Almost every conversation we ever had. I mean, it was -- it was a constant

conversation.
Q.

(By Ms. Eckmann) Alright. Do you remember the conversation you had

during the camping trip in the summer or September of 1997?
A. In the camping trip of 1997, I'm not quite sure what you're saying.
Q. You testified about a camping trip on Labor Day --

A. Yes.

Q. -- weekend, 1997. Did she express fear to you during that?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Okay. Did she tell you what she was afraid of?

A. Yeah, she was afraid of Mr. Shackelford.
Q. What was she afraid that was going to happen?

MR. BARKER: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. He (sic) was afraid he was going to kill her.
Q. (By Ms. Eckmann) She was afraid?

A. Afraid he was going to kill her.

(Tr., p.2036, L.12 - p.2037, L.17.)
Phillip Wadlow testified to hearsay statements allegedly made to him by Ms. Fontaine
nearly a year before her death, sometime during the middle of 1998. (Tr., p.875, L. 21 p.877, L.14.). According to Mr. Wadlow:
"She was very upset and she made comments that she was -- she was
afraid. And at one point she had even made comments -- now I could be
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-- it had to have been that first house, that she thought that she was -- she
had said one time that she thought that she was going to have to just leave,
change her name and nobody know where she was at. She was afraid."
(Tr., p.877, Ls.8-14.)
Suzanne Ninichuck was allowed to testifY to hearsay statements allegedly made to
her by Ms. Fontaine in 1998 and the early months of 1999:
Q.

Alright.

Did she express her mental condition in regard to the

defendant, Dale Shackelford?
A. I don't understand what you want.
Q.

Okay. And I'm asking the question in a real narrow fashion. So, did

she express whether she was afraid of the defendant?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?

A. She was afraid that he was going to kill her.
(Tr., p.2139, Ls.16-25.)
Brian Raymond testified to hearsay statements allegedly made to him by Ms.
Fontaine in January of 1999 (Tr., p. 1975,1. 13 - p. 1977,1. 10.).
Q. Alright. And did Donna Fontaine talk to you

about her mental state in regard to the defendant, Dale Shackelford?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she tell you?

A.

She told me that she was very scared. That she had some -- something going

on and she didn't, you know, really tell me exactly what it was. I don't think she
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wanted me to know. But she told me that she had -- was having a lot of problems
with Dale and that she was very, very scared.
(Tr., p.1976, 1.25 - p. 1977,1.10.)
Donald Boyle testified to hearsay statements allegedly made to him by Ms.
Fontaine in early March of 1999. (Tr., p. 1233,1. 8 - p. 1237,1. 3.) Boyle testified that
Ms. Fontaine stated that she was afraid that Shackelford would kill her if she did not drop
the Missouri charges. (Tr., p. 1235, L.13 - p.1237, 1.3.)
Melinda Wadlow testified to hearsay statements allegedly made to her by Ms.
Fontaine in April of 1999, and throughout the preceding year. (Tr., p.943, 1.10 - p. 948,
1. 10.) Wadlow testified that Fontaine told her that Fontaine was afraid of Shackelford
because Fontaine thought Shackelford was going to hurt her. (Tr., p.943, 1.10 - p.948,
L.lo.)

Rule 803 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence sets forth the exceptions to the prohibition
against the admission of hearsay. Subsection (3) of Rule 803 provides that
[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness.

Then existing mental, emotion, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
considered the admissibility of state of mind evidence, although most of the decisions·
precede the adoption of the Rules of Evidence.
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Idaho did not adopt the Rules of

Evidence until January of 1985, and said rules did not become effective until July of
1985. See l.R.E. 1101.

In Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 98 (1933), the United States Supreme
Court considered whether a victim's statement to her nurse when she was ill, and one
week prior to her death, stating that her defendant-husband had poisoned her, was
admissible in the defendant's murder trial over his objection. In considering whether this
statement constituted state of mind evidence, the Court concluded that while the
defendant put the victim's state of mind at issue by presenting evidence of suicide
through the victim's statements to friends reflecting a "weariness of life and a readiness to
end it", the State could only offer "declarations [by the victim] evincing a different state
of mind, declarations consistent with the persistence ofa will to live." Id. at 103-104.
The Court observed circumstances under which state of mind, if relevant, can be proven
by "contemporaneous declarations of feeling or intent." Id. at 104 (citations omitted).
In Shepard, the Court concluded that
"[d]eclarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been
sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to
the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay
if the distinction were ignored....

The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at
least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important,
it spoke to a past act, and more than that, to an act by some one not the
speaker. Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be
disentangled by ajury."

Id. at 105-106. The court reversed the defendant's conviction.

Idaho Courts also addressed the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule
prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence. In State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727,
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729,471 P.2d 582, 584 (1970), the defendant was convicted at jury trial of two counts of
second degree murder in connection with the shooting deaths of two women who owned
the hotel where he worked. At trial, over the defendant's objection, the State introduced
testimony from a friend of one of the victims, who testified she [one of the victims] told
him she was "scared to death" of the defendant, who was "not so bad when he's drinking
beer, but when he's drinking whiskey he's crazier than a tick." Id. at 731, 471 P.2d at
586 ..
With little analysis, the Court found the statement to be probative of the victim's
state of mind and attitude. Id. ("Evidence tending to show the mental state of the victim
and ill-feeling or hostility between decedent and defendant is admissible.") Accordingly,
the Court found no error in the admission of this statement where the district court had
given a limiting instruction to the jury which narrowly restricted consideration of the
statement to the victim's state of mind, and for no other purpose. Id. No such limiting
instruction was given in Shackelford's case.
The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule was again considered by the Idaho
Supreme Court six years later in State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 546 P.2d 1180 (1976).
Again, the Court considered this issue prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence. In
Goodrich, the defendant was convicted at jury trial of second-degree murder in

connection with the shooting death of her ex-husband. Id. at 474,546 P.2d at 1182. On
appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's admission,· over her objection, of a
number of statements allegedly made by the victim to a third-party. Id. at 475-476, 546
P.2d at 1183-1184.
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The statements at issue in Goodrich included the victim's statements that (l) the
defendant shot at the victim with a shotgun, five and a half years before his death; (2) the
defendant threatened to kill him, his then-girlfriend, and herself, following a fight
between the victim and the defendant a month prior to his death; (3) the defendant
attacked a woman she saw dancing with the victim at a party two months prior to the
victim's death; and (4) the defendant caused a fight at a bar which resulted in the victim
and a friend getting badly beaten. Id. at 476, 546 P.2d at 1184. The defendant argued
that the district court erred in admitting such statements without a limiting or cautionary
instruction to the jury. Id.
This Court observed that a victim's statements which reflect the victim's state of
mind may be admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule where
the victim's state of mind is relevant to an issue involved in the criminal proceedings. Id.
at 477,546 P.2d at 1185. However, even if relevant, such evidence must be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.

Id..

The Court observed that other jurisdictions permit admission of a

statement of fear made by a deceased victim to a third party in a homicide case where,
inter alia, the defendant builds his defense around a claim that the victim committed
suicide. Id. n.7. In such circumstances, a victim's statements, which are contrary to a
design to take his or her own life, are relevant. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. DelValle,
351 Mass. 489, 221 N.E.2d 1966». In Shackelford's case, it is noteworthy that none of
the hearsay statements at issue are contrary to a design to commit suicide, indeed, they
have nothing to do with the subject of suicide.
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The Goodrich court concluded that the victim's statements to a third-party were
inadmissible because they were tiot accompanied by a limiting instruction to the jury,
precluding consideration of the statements for any purpose, other than to demonstrate the
state of mind of the victim. ld By failing to provide such an instruction, the Court
concluded that the jury was improperly permitted to consider the statements for the truth
of the factual matters stated therein, in violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. ld.
at 479,546 P.2d at 1187.
The Goodrich court observed:
[a] limiting instruction is an absolutely necessary preventative measure,
which must be given by the trial judge, to insure that the jury' s
consideration of the statement is confined to whatever probative value that
statement has on the issue of the declarant-victim's state of mind. Failure
to so instruct the jury, allows the jurors to consider the statement for the
truth of the factual matters related therein. This not only defeats the
purpose of this narrow exception to the hearsay rule, but is unduly
prejudicial to an accused's right to a fair trial.

ld. at 478-479, 546 P.2d at 1186-1187. Although "[t]he initial burden rests upon defense

counsel to make his objection known to the trial judge of the unlimited use of this 'state
of mind' testimony, "a limiting instruction is required at the time the testimony is
introduced, if requested, and also in the final instructions." ld at 479, 546 P.2d at 1187.
This Court again, prior to the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, considered
the admissibility of state of mind evidence in State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 381, 630
P.2d 665, 668 (1981). In Garcia, the defendant was convicted at jury trial of conspiracy
to commit murder, but acquitted of first-degree murder. The State alleged that the
defendant conspired with the victim's estranged husband to kill the victim by mailing her
strychnine disguised as medication.

ld. at 380,
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630 P.2d at 667.

At trial, over

defendant's objection, the court allowed the admission of a statement from the victim's
cousin that on the date of her death, the victim received a package that consisted of a
tube of cream and some "merjorales", which were described as "homemade analgesic
tablets or pills for colds and headaches." Id. at 381, 630 P.2d at 668. The cousin was
also allowed to testifY, again over defendant's objection, that upon receiving the package,
the victim commented, "Look how nice the lady is, she even sent me mejorales." Id.

On appeal, the defendant asserted the district court erred in admitting the victim's
statements because they were hearsay and not subject to any exception. Id. The Court
noted that the statement was offered at trial to demonstrate the victim's state of mind,
specifically that she did not expect or anticipate a package from the defendant. This was
significant because it seemed the defendant had, on prior occasions, sent the victim tubes
of facial cream. Id.
The Garcia Court noted that "[i]n almost all cases, statements made by a murder
victim to a third party prior to the fatal incident are held to be inadmissible hearsay." Id.
(citations omitted). The Court noted there are exceptions where a victim's statements
reflecting the victim's fear of the defendant will be admissible pursuant to the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule. Id. The Court noted that these exceptions include (1)
when a defendant claims self-defense; (2) a victim's statements inconsistent with a desire
to design to end his or her own life where the defense alleges the victim's death was a
suicide, not a homicide; (3) when the defendant claims the shooting was accidental; and
(4) when the specific mens rea is at issue, for example, if the murder was premeditated or

not. Id. at 382, 630 P.2d at 669 (citations omitted).
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The Garcia court concluded the victim's statement was admitted in error because
the defense did not argue self-defense, raise the specter of suicide, claim the victim's
death was accidental, or argue the lack ofa particular mens rea. Id. at 382-383, 630 P.2d
at 669-670. Rather, the defense simply argued that the victim's husband murdered the
victim through independent action, Id. at 383,630 P.2d at 670. Although erroneous, the
Court found the admission of the victim's statement to be harmless in light of the
defendant's admission to the victim's cousin, following the victim's death, that she had
sent the package of cream and mejorales in the mail tothevictimafterall.Id
Similar to Garcia, in this case Shackelford did not argue self-defense, raise the
specter of suicide, claim that Donna's death was an accident, or argue the lack of a
particular mens rea. Rather, Shackelford's defense has consistently been simply that it
was not Shackelford who committed the crime. Ms. Fontaine's so called 'state of mind'
is irrelevant to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator and highly prejudicial to
Shackelford.

Unlike Garcia, the case against Shackelford is entirely circumstantial and

does not feature any incriminating statements by the accused.
Each of these cases illustrate that a victim's statements reflecting fear of the
defendant only becomes relevant where a defendant builds his or her defense around
particular theories, including suicide. Here, the district court permitted the admission of
Ms. Fontaine's statements expressing fear of Shackelford because, as the court
mistakenly found, "the victim's mental state is now at issue. I do think that this jury has .
heard testimony that the defendant on the night of the deaths of Donna Fontaine and Fred
Pahluniuk was injecting the possibility of suicide. And I do think her mental status thus
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becomes relevant under 803(3). And I will allow statements of Donna Fontaine to be
admitted relative to her fear of Dale Shackelford." (Tr., p.849, Ls.3-1 1.)
The district court completely overlooked the fact that it was the state, not
Shackelford, who 'injected' the possibility of suicide.

Shackelford never volnnteered

.the topic of suicide to Skiles. Rather, after Shackelford was asked by Skiles whether
Shackelford thought suicide was a possibility, Shackelford specifically stated that he
"didn't want to say because he didn't know for sure." (Tr., p. 395, Ls. 13-14). Also, at
the time the district court made this mistaken ruling, the state was well aware that its
own expert would testifY that it was highly unlikely that either Ms. Fontaine or Mr.
Pahluniuk's fatal wounds were the result of suicide.
If the district court's ruling is correct, then the hearsay rule has been swallowed
whole by the exception. If the district court's ruling is correct, then a homicide victim's
out-of-court statements expressing fear of the accused will always be admitted whenever
there is a mere possibility of suicide. Should this court uphold this ruling, it will be an
open invitation to the prosecution in all homicide cases to conjure up the mere possibility
of suicide in order to allow the wholesale admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay to
bolster a circumstantial case.
Even if arguendo Shackelford did somehow inject suicide as an issue in the case,
the disputed statements in this case as described above bear marginal, if any, relevance to
the issue of whether Donna Fontaine may have been inclined to commit suicide. Even if
they are marginally relevant, their probative value is greatly outweighed by their
prejudicial effect. lR.E.403.

By admitting the prejudicial hearsay statements of Donna

Fontaine during the state's case-in-chief, the district court has denied Shackelford his
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right to confront witnesses, his right to a fair trial, and his right to due process of law in
contravention of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF
SONJA AND MARY ABITZ ..
Standard of Review.

The interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the

interpretation of a statute, is reviewed de novo. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965
P.2d 174, 181 (1998)

However, the decision to admit hearsay evidence under an

exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 822, 965 P.2d at 182.
Sonja Abitz's statements to Dorothy Cox.
Neither Mary nor Sonja Abitz testified at Shackelford's trial. Dorothy Cox
testified that she worked with Sonja and Mary Abitz driving school busses for the
Kendrick School District. (Tr. p. 2584). Dorothy Cox was permitted to testifY, over
Shackelford's objection, that about two or three weeks prior to May 29, 1999, Sonja
Abitz told her, referring to Ms. Fontaine's property, that "we're going to bum her house
down." (Tr. p. 2589, Ls. 8-9, 20). Cox knew that Sonja was Shackelford's fiance. (Tr.
p. 2590, Ls. 17-18). Cox testified that during the spring of 1999 Sonja Abitz expressed
her dislike for Fontaine and referred to her as "the bitch." (Tr. p. 2594, Ls. 14-15, p.
2588, Ls. 4-8).
The District Court allowed the introduction of Sonja Abitz's statements to Cox as
statements of a co-conspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3-22).

(Tr. p. 2582, Ls.

This was error for two reasons: first, at the time the statements were made, the

conspiracy had not been formed.

The indictment alleges that the conspiracy took place
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between May 25-29, 1999. (R. 27966, pp. 2-3). The second reason this testimony should
not have been admitted is that the statements, on their face, are not made in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
Admission of the out of court statements of Sonja Abitz to Cox violated
Shackelford's right to confront witnesses, his right to due process of law, and to a fair
trial.
Mary Abitz's statements to law enforcement officers.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all
criminal cases, the accused shall enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with witnesses against
him."

u.s.

Const. Amend. VI

In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004) the

United States Supreme Court held that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the
proponent can prove that the declarant is unavailable and that the opponent had had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was made. Id.
at 1374.

Prior to Crawford, courts determined inadmissibility of hearsay statements

based on their reliability. Statements that fell within well-established hearsay exceptions
were deemed reliable. However, after Crawford, where testimonial statements are at
issue, the only indicia of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands are
confrontation. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. Two years after the Crawford decision, the
Supreme Court held that statements made to police during the course of their
investigation of a past crime are "testimonial" in nature.

Hammons v. Indiana,
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U.S. 813; 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).
The prosecution was permitted to elicit testimony from Sergeant Earl Aston and
Detective Kurtis Hall regarding statements made to them by Mary Abitz in the course of
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his investigation; the statements involved a tape that Ms. Abitz claimed Shackelford had
sent to her. (Tr., p. 2735, 1. 14 - p. 2738, L.4.). Under Crawford and Hammons, supra,
these statements are clearly testimonial.

Their admission violated Shackelford's Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses against him.
Deputy Prosecutor's Statement to Investigating Officers.
The Court also allowed statements attributed to Robin Eckmann to come into
evidence via Sgt. Aston's testimony. (Tr., p.2736, Ls.4-.12.)

These statements are also

clearly testimonial under Crawford and Hammons, supra, and their admission violated
Shackelford's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses against him.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY A

HOLDER INSTRUCTION LIMITING THE EFFECT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
Standard of Review. The correctness of jury instructions is a question of law over
which this court exercises free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury
instruction should or should not have been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to
support the instruction.

Kuhn v. Proctor,

141 Idaho 459, 462, III P.3rd 144, 147

(2005).
As of the date of the crime, May 29,1999, and for twenty years prior, Idaho law
entitled a defendant to a special jury instruction when the prosecution's case was wholly
based on circumstantial evidence. The instruction, known as the Holder instruction,
limited the effect of circumstantial evidence by informing the jury the prosecution's
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"evidence must be sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt
of the defendant." State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 350, 787 P.2d 1152,1158 (1990);
State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129,594 P.2d 639 (1979).

Mr. Shackelford was indicted on February 11, 2000, for offenses, including
murder, allegedly cpmmitted before, and on or about, May 29, 1999. (R. 27966, pp. 1-4)
Trial commenced in October of 2000. On July 20, 2000, this Court decided State v.
Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000), in which the Court overruled
Holder. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The presentation of evidence in this case lasted nearly two months, begi1111ing on
October 30, 2000 and ending on December 19, 2000.

Near the conclusion of the

evidence, Shackelford filed a motion requesting a Holder instruction. (R. 27966, pp.
2133-2135.) Following the presentation of all evidence, the district court heard
arguments on proposed jury instructions.

The court denied Shackelford's requested

instruction solely on the gro1111d that Humpherys no longer permitted Holder instructions.
(Tr., p.5252, 1.20 - p.5253, 1.17.)

A.

The Failure To Give A Holder Instruction Constitutes Reversible Error
For twenty yeats prior to Mr. Shackelford's trial, when the prosecution's case

against a defendant rested entirely upon circumstantial evidence, an instruction was
necessary to distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Holder, 100
Idaho 129, 132-33, 594 P.2d 639, 642-43 (1979). The instruction, known as a Holder
instruction, essentially advised the jury that "[iJf the evidence is susceptible of two
reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to
the defendant's i1111ocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the
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defendant's innocence, and to reject the other which points to the defendant's guilt."
State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19,909 P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1996).

The Holder instruction is based on the concern that a conviction based entirely on
circumstantial evidence is inherently unreliable and may result in the conviction of an
innocent defendant. See e.g., State v. Hix, 58 Idaho 730, 743, 78 P.2d 1003, 1009 (1938).
In Hix, the Court held that, although circumstantial evidence "can be so certain and
definite as to leave no room for reasonable doubt," in some cases "circumstances can be
very strong against an innocent person but at the same time not exclude a reasonable
theory of innocence. In such cases circumstantial evidence is very dangerous as it arouses
violent suspicions which are difficult to explain or rebut even by an innocent person." Id.
(emphasis added).

The Holder instruction was viewed as a benefit, specifically, an

additional safeguard against wrongful convictions. Randles, 117 Idaho at 350, 787 P.2d
at 1158. The function of the Holder instruction was to "guide the jury in evaluating the
evidence before it." Id. (emphasis added).

The Holder instruction "limit[ed] the effect of the evidence" where the
prosecution's case was based wholly on circumstantial evidence. State v. Langford, 136
Idaho 334, 339, n.3, 33 P.3d 567, 572, n.3 (Ct.App. 2001)(emphasis added); State v.
Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000). Thus, juries were instructed to
be more skeptical of circumstantial evidence, placing an additional burden on the
prosecution of cases involving wholly circumstantial evidence as opposed to a
combination of circumstantial and direct evidence.
Idaho precedent supports the use of Holder instructions as a clarification of the
state's burden of proof. See State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct.App.1987),
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rev. granted State v. Nelson. 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988) (holding that after
"briefing and argument and a review of the instructions, we are of the opinion that the
Court of Appeals' decision correctly followed our decision in State v. Holder, supra,
which we decline to overrule.)
The refusal to give an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of
circumstantial evidence,

when warranted, constituted reversible error.

Holder, 100

Idaho at 133, 594 P.2d at 643. The district court refused to give Shackelford's requested
Holder instruction. (R. 27966, pp.2133-2136) The question for this Court is two-fold: (1)
whether Humpherys or Holder applied to Mr. Shackelford's case; and (2) if Holder
applied, then whether the prosecution's case against Mr. Shackelford rested entirely upon
circumstantial evidence.
a. Application of Humpherys rather than Holder constituted a violation of
the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the Idaho and United States
Constitutions.
The states are prohibited from enacting an ex post facto law. U.S. Const., Art. I, §
10, cl. 1. The federal and Idaho constitutions prohibit changes in the law and changes in
procedure that affect matters of substance. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43

(1990); Dobbett v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). A change in law will be deemed to
affect matters of substance where it increases the punishment or changes the ingredients
of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574, 580 (1884). "Subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible than overt
ones." Collins, 497 U.S., at 46. The prohibition against ex postfacto laws applies equally
between state legislatures and state Supreme Courts with the sole distinction that the
latter draws upon the Due Process Clause. See Marks v. Us., 430 U.S, 188, 192 (1977);
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Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 565 (1931); State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159,627 P.2d 788

(1981)
There are four general categories of ex post facto laws proscribed by the federal
constitution: 1) a law that makes conduct criminal that was not criminal before the law
was enacted; 2) a law that aggravates a crime or makes it more severe; 3) a law that
increases the punishment for an offense; 4) a law that alters the legal rules of evidence by
permitting less or different testimony to obtain a conviction than was permitted when the
particular offense was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 42; Carmell v.
Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798»; State v. Byers,

102 Idaho 159,627 P.2d 788 (1981).
The fourth category prohibits both laws that lower the burden of proof and laws
that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden. Carmel!, 529 U.S. at
541.

The fourth category of ex post facto laws serves the principal interests of

fundamental fairness and allows fair warning of legislative enactments. Id. At --- The
Supreme Court has labeled "grossly unfair a law that retrospectively reduces the quantum
of evidence. necessary to convict a defendant for a particular offense." Id. at ---.
In Carmel!, at the time the defendant committed the charged offense, a Texas
statute required corroborating evidence to support the victim's testimony. By the time
the defendant proceeded to trial however the statute had been amended to remove the
corroboration requirement. Id. at 517-18. The United States Supreme Court determined
that the amendment fell within the fourth category of prohibited laws because it
"authorize[d] a conviction on less evidence than previously required." Id. at 531. In
essence, the amendment at issue in Carmel! changed the amount of evidence necessary
for the prosecution to meet its burden of proof. Before the amendment, the victim's
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testimony and corroboration were required, while after the amendment, testimony alone
was sufficient Carmel!, 529 U.S. at 517-18. By removing the corroboration requirement,
the prosecution could meet its burden with less evidence.
The Supreme Court made clear, however, that not all evidentiary rules implicate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. "Ordinary rules of evidence ... do not violate the Clause"
because "by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, [the rules] do not at all
subvert the presumption of innocence, because they do not concern whether the
admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption." Id. at 533 n. 23. The
Court differentiated sufficiency of the evidence rules, like the one at issue in Carmel!,
with admissibility rules. "The issue of admissibility of evidence is simply different from
the question whether the properly admitted evidence is sufficient to convict the
defendant." Id. at 546.
In Nelson the court rejected the state's assertion that the court should "overturn
six decades of case law and abandon the 'reasonable hypothesis' instruction requirement
because it may be confusing to the jury." 112 Idaho at 249,731 P.2d at 794. In doing so,
the court noted that:
we do not find, the precise source of the "confusion" that the state claims.
To the contrary, ... a "reasonable hypothesis" instruction gives"sharpened
clarity" to the meaning of reasonable doubt in a circumstantial evidence
case. Such an instruction may force a jury to think extra carefully about
its choices of inferences, but that is wholly appropriate where life or
liberty may tum on the inferences drawn."
State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 249, 731 P.2d 788, 794 (CtApp.1987) citing State
v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493 (Ct.App.l985).

Because the crime in this case

was committed and the prosecution commenced while Holder was still good law,
Shackelford should have been allowed a jury instruction that correctly defined the proper
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use of circumstantial evidence which was in place at the time the crime was committed.
Applying Humphry retroactively to Shackelford's case allowed the state to obtain a
conviction using a lower quantum of proof than was required at the time of the
commission of the crime.
b. The prosecution's case against Mr. Shackelford was based entirely on
circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is the testimony of a witness that indirectly proves one of
the facts on which a party has burden of proof in case, by means of proving one or more
facts from which fact at issue may be inferred; it produces no witnesses who saw
questioned circumstance occur. State v. Sundquist, 128 Idaho 780, 781, 918 P.2d 1225,
1226 (Ct. App. 1996). Direct evidence, by contrast, is the testimony of witnesses who,
with their physical senses, perceived conduct constituting the offense, and whose
testimony relates to what they thereby perceived. Id. (emphasis added).
In this case there was no direct evidence against Shackelford. The state's case is
built on a dubious motive and depends on the testimony of disreputable witnesses such as
Lasater and Millar who were compensated with lenient outcomes in exchange for
testifYing against Shackelford.
It was error for the district court to refuse to give the jury a Holder instruction

limiting the use of circumstantial evidence.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH LESSENED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF
AND PERMITTED A LESS THAN UNANIMOUS VERDICT.

32

The correctness of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court
excercises free review. Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462; 111 P.3rd 144 (2005).
Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review. State v. Weber, 140
Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004).
Conspiracy to Commit Murder Instructions
Count IV charged Shackelford with Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder
"on or about the 25 th to the 29 th day of May, 1999". (R. 27966, p. 2-3). This count
charged that in furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the purpose thereof, "the said
Defendant performed the following overt acts in the County of Latah:"
I.

Dale Carter Shackelford threatened to kill Douna

Fontaine.
2. Dale Carter Shackelford hid his presence from Donna
Fontaine, Gary Fontaine and Ted Meske.
3.

Dale Carter Shackelford went to Donna Fontaine's

residence at 2168 Three Bear Road.
4. Dale Carter Shackelford shot Donna Fontaine with a
shotgun and a pistol, killing her.
Jury Instruction 23 informed the jury that it in order for Shackelford to be guilty
of this charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia, that "one of the
parties to the agreement performed at least one" of the four alleged overt acts.

(emphasis supplied). (R27966, p. 2200.) This differs significantly from the Indictment,
which required the state to prove that "the said defendant [Shackelford] perfonned the
follOWing overt acts". (emphasis supplied).

Conspiracy to Commit Arson Instructions.
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The jury instructions on Conspiracy to Commit Arson are similarly flawed.
Count V charged conspiracy to commit arson. (R. 27966, p.3). This count charged that
on or about the 25 th to 29th days of May, 1999, "the said defendant performed the
following overt acts in the County of Latah:"
1. Dale Carter Shackelford hid his presence from Donna
Fontaine, Gary Fontaine, and Ted Meske.
2.

Dale Carter Shackelford went to Donna Fontaine's

residence at 2168 Three Bear Road.
3. Dale Carter Shackelford poured flarmnable liquid in the
garage at that location.
4. Dale Carter Shackelford lit fires in both stories of the
garage.
Jury Instruction 26 informed the jury that it in order for Shackelford to be guilty
of this charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia, that "one of the
parties to the agreement performed at least one" of the four alleged overt acts.

(emphasis supplied).

(R 27966, p. 2203).

This differed significantly from the

Indictment, which required the state to prove that "the said defendant [Shackelford]
performed the following overt acts". (emphasis supplied).
Jury verdicts in felony cases must be unanimous. Idaho Const. art. I, § 7; ICR
3.1 (a).

Where ambiguous jury instructions confuse the jury as to what it is to

unanimously find, such instructions violate a defendant's constitutional right to a
unanimous verdict.

See. e.g., United States v. Garcia-Rivera, 353 F.3d 788, 792 (9th

Cir. 2003).
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In Garcia-Rivera, the defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm. The trial court instructed the jury that they "must unanimously
agree that the [firearm1possession occurred" on one of three separate occasions. Id. The
jury returned a guilty verdict but did not indicate on which occasion or event they
unanimously agreed upon.

The Ninth Circuit held that the instruction was ambiguous

and resulted in a questionable verdict because it allowed the jury to conclude that they
could decide unanimously that possession occurred on any combination of the three dates
enumerated as opposed to deciding unanimously on one date. Id. Because the jury
verdicts did not indicate which date or event they chose to determine when the defendant
possessed a firearm, and because they were not polled for such purpose, the Ninth Circuit
held the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id.
In this case, Instruction no. 41 informed the jury that their verdicts must be
unanimous. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2220) However, it is impossible to tell from the verdicts
which overt act or acts the jury unanimously agreed upon, nor is it possible to tell
whether the jury found that Shackelford or "one of the parties" performed an overt act.
The various instructions make it impossible to know whether the jury unanimously
agreed on all elements of the conspiracy counts.

The instructions are ambiguous

because it is not at all clear. whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Shackelford committed all of the overt acts, pursuant to the counts in the indictment and
to their corresponding instructions 22 and 25, or whether the jury merely found that "one
of the parties" performed "at least one" of the overt acts pursuant to instructions 23 and
26.

From these instructions, there is no way to know which overt act or acts the jury
unanimously agreed upon to find Mr. Shackelford guilty of the conspiracy charges. For
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example, six jurors may have believed that Shackelford threatened to kill Donna
Fontaine, option A, and six jurors may have believed Mr. Shackelford shot and killed her,
option D, but all twelve jurors may not have nnanimously agreed upon anyone option.
Because the jury was never polled to determine which of the acts the jury nnanimously
found to fulfill the requirements of a conspiracy, the guilty verdicts on the conspiracy
counts are questionable.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the jury was instructed on both
conspiracy charges that the overt acts were performed in Latah County, Idaho and that
they were performed between May 25 and May 29, 1999. There is no evidence that
Shackelford threatened to kill Donna Fontaine in Latah County, Idaho between May 25
and May 29, 1999. However, it is impossible for this Court to say that this is not the only
overt act indeed found by the jury. The jury may have found that Shackelford or one of
the parties performed an overt act for which there is not sufficient evidence in the State's
case. It is impossible for this Court to say that the state has met it's burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
When the state charged Shackelford in this case, it assumed the burden to prove
every essential element of the offenses it chose to bring. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307,61 L. Ed. 2d 560,99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,25 L. Ed. 2d
368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 902, 749 P.2d 1025,
1027 (Ct. App. 1988). The state drafted the indictment, not Shackelford.
The jury instructions on the conspiracy counts are ambiguous and permitted the
jury to return a non-unanimous verdict·on proof of less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Shackelford is entitled to a new trial.
Jury Instructions Regarding Arson
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Count III of the indictment charged Shackelford with Arson in the First Degree.
This count alleged that Shackelford set fire or damaged a dwelling by "pouring a
flammable liquid in the building and lighting a fire on both stories."

(R. 27966, p. 2).

Jury Instruction 18 also contained the "lighting a fire on both stories" clause. (R. 27966,
p.2195).

However, Instruction 19 makes no reference to the "lighting a fire on both

stories" feature of the indictment and the preceding instruction.

(R. 27966, p. 2196).

(See also Tr., p. 5449, L. 25 - p. 5459, L.24(Discussion resulting in the Court explaining
to jury to look to the elements instruction to answer their question of whether they need
to find that the fire was lit on both stories of the garage)).
The jury was obviously confused by this discrepancy.

During the Jury

deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the Court:
"Must it be determined that the fire was lit on both stories before it can be
determined arson? Or that the defendant can be found guilty of arson as in
number 18? Signed, Lori Bruce." (Tr., p. 5450, Ls. 2 - 6).

After lengthy discussion, the Court addressed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, instructions numbered 18 and 25 state the charges
of arson in the first degree and conspiracy to commit arson in the first
degree, which are contained in the indictment.
Instructions 19 and 26 contain the elements that are necessary for the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant to be found guilty of
arson in the first degree and conspiracy to commit. arson in the first
degree. You will need to review the elements instructions, instruction
numbers 19 and 26, to determine the answer to your questions.

(Tr., p. 5460, Ls. 14 - 25). From these instructions and the Court's unclear answer to the
jury regarding their question, it is impossible to determine the basis on which the jury
found

Shackelford guilty of arson or even conspiracy to commit arson. Further, the

Court failed to ensure that the jury found the elements as charged in the indictment.
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Instruction number 19 allows the jury to find less than Count III in the indictment and
Instruction number 18 by failing to instruct that it must find-consistent with the charge in
the indictment-- that the fire was lit on both stories.
The state drafted the indictment, not Shackelford. As this Court has stated, "It is
a right of the accused to be informed of the exact charge against him. He is entitled to
know for what specific offense he is to be tried. Art. 1, § 13, Idaho Constitution ... "

Chapa, 127 Idaho at 790, 906 P.2d at 640 (citing State v. Petty, 73 Idaho 136, 138,248
P.2d 218, 219 (1952». The United States Supreme Court has held that a conviction upon

,
a charge not made would be a sheer denial of due process. Chapa, 127 Idaho at 790, 906
P.2d at 640 (Citing De Jong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259 (1937». In
this case, the ambiguous jury instructions certainly mislead and confused the jury, as
evidenced in their note to the Judge, and the failure to correct this ambiguity resulted in a
verdict which was not based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of arson
as charged in Count III of the indictment.
Jury Instruction Regarding Accomplice Liability
Shackelford was indicted by a grand jury on February 11, 2000, for two counts of
murder in the first degree, I.C. §§ 18-4001 and 4003, one count of arson in the first
degree, I.C. § 18-802, and one count of preparing false evidence, LC. § 18-2602. (R. Vol.
IX, p. 1743.) Counts I, II, III, and VI charged Mr. Shackelford with actually committing
the aforementioned crimes. There was no charge or language charging Mr. Shackelford
with aiding and abetting or purely facilitating the crimes charged. Id. at 1743-1748.
However, Instruction No. 33 was read to the jury, setting forth a theory of
accomplice liability.

On its face, the instruction is not ambiguous; however, when
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applied in the context of Mr. Shackelford's trial, the violation of the right to a unanimous
jury verdict becomes clear. The instruction reads:
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates
in the acts constituting a crime and a person who, either before or during
its commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes,
encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be
found guilty of the crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent
consent to the planning or commission or a crime is not sufficient to make
one an accomplice.

(R. Vol. XI, p. 2212.)

The ambiguity arises when taking into account the indictment and the instructions
to the jury regarding Shackelford's participation or facilitation in the murders of Donna
Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk, the arson, and the charge of preparing false evidence. In
instruction numbers 8 and 15, the jury was instructed to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Shackelford killed Donna Fontaine and FredPalahniuk. Id. at 2183,2191. Instruction
number 19 provided the elements that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for
the jury to find Mr. Shackelford guilty of arson in the first degree. Id. at 2196. This
instruction stated that the jury must find that the defendant willfully damaged a dwelling
by fire or explosion. Finally, Instruction number 30 told the jury it must find that the
defendant willfully prepared false evidence with the intent to produce it or allow it to be
produced for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Id. at 2209. Not a single one of these
instructions directed the jury to find that Mr. Shackelford aided and abetted any of the
delineated crimes. Appropriately, these instructions mirrored the indictment under which
Mr. Shackelford was charged.
The addition of Instruction 33 undoubtedly confused and misled the jury during
their deliberations. Further, without a charge in the indictment that Mr. Shackelford could
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be found guilty of aiding and abetting the crimes, there was nothing to put him on notice
to prepare a defense to these charges. During trial, the State's theory was that
Shackelford committed the murders,. set fire to the garage at 2168 Three Bear Road, and
prepared a tape to be used at grand jury proceedings to deceive the grand jury.
At closing arguments, the State asserted that "this case is about the killing of
these two people, Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk by that man, right there
(indicating)." (Tr., p. 5269, Ls. 11-13.)(See also Tr., p. 5435, Ls. 10-13.)("It's very
possible that [Brian Abitz] did some things wrong that day at the bidding of Dale
Shackelford, but he did not kill Douna and Fred, Dale Shackelford did. ") The State
argued through out its closing argument that Shackelford killed Donna Fontaine and Fred
Palahniuk, burned down the garage and prepared false evidence. (Tr., p. 5268, 1. 17 - p.
5299, 1.12 (Mr. Christensen's closing argument); Tr., p. 5300,1. 19 - p. 5359,1. 9 (Ms.
Eckmann's closing argument): Tr., p. 5412, 1. 15 - p. 5438,1. 2 (Ms. Eckmann's rebuttal
argument).)
Shackelford asserts that he was denied due process because he was not given
notice in the indictment that he could be found guilty of aiding and abetting, the theory
under which he may have been convicted. (See Tr., p. 5938, Ls. 4-22.) Shackelford's
counsel throughout the trial presented a defense based upon the indictments that charged
Shackelford with committing these crimes, presenting evidence that Shackelford did not
commit these crimes. By giving the accomplice instruction, the Court allowed
Shackelford to be. convicted under an alternative theory against which he had no reason
to defend. See State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 788, 906 P.2d 636, 638 (1995)(holding that
defendant was deprived of due process when the state, having charged the commission
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of only one offense in the information, advanced charges of two distinct crimes through
instructions given to the jury).

Jury Instructions Defining Preparing False Evidence
I.C. §18-2602 defines the crime of Preparing False Evidence as follows:
Every person gUilty of preparing any false or antedated
book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter
or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be
produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as
genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry
whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of a felony.
The State charged, and the jury convicted, Shackelford of Preparing False
Evidence. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the element that the
evidence was produced in the State of Idaho or that Mr. Shackelford had any role in
making the evidence available for legal proceedings. (Tr., p. 2793, 1. 9 - 2804,1. 25.)
Instruction 30 is ambiguous because the word "produced" is never defined and it
is impossible to know whether the jury agreed that produced meant to actually make the
tape or whether it meant to give the tape to someone or bring it to someone's attention.
(R. VoL XI, p. 2209.) Instruction No. 30 lists the elements of the charge of Preparing
False Evidence. The instruction stated in part that the jury had to find that Shackelford
willfully prepared false evidence, "with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be
produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose." (R. VoL XI, p. 2209.)
The problem with this instruction as applied to Shackelford's case is that the
Court never defined "produce" for the jury. Because of the lack of a coherent definition,
some jurors may have defined "produce" as "to make," while others may have defined it
as "to give." The Court itself seemed to confuse the issue:
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THE COURT: I think the evidence has to be that he prepared it, not that
he produced it, and that his intent in preparing it was that it be played. I
guess I don't see what you're looking at as far as that's concerned. Every
person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book, paper or other
thing with the intent to produce it or allow it to be produced for any
fraudulent or deceitful purpose as genuine or true.
(Tr., p. 5542, Ls. 11-19.) Further, when trial counsel sought clarification from the Court
on this issue, the Court refused to expound.
MR. MAHAFFY: For clarification, Your Honor, and for my records
clarification, is the Court ruling that the clause, produce it or allow it to be
produced, does that mean made or given?
THE COURT: The -- I'm not going to pars the statute for you, Mr.
MahaffY. I think I have made a record as far as that's concerned. And as I
have said, if a si'ne' qua non of the statute is that it be produced and that
there has to be evidence that it was produced, then I think on this record,
on this trial, that was not done.
Now, as I say, I haven't gone back and had the benefit of a transcript, but I
don't recall that testimony being presented, but I don't think it's a
necessary element in order for Mr. Shackelford to be found guilty of
violating 18-2602.

(Tr., p. 5545, L. 11 - p. 5546, L. 1.)
The district court's comments are enlightening for present purposes because if
"produce" was defined as "to make" by one or more jurors, than it is noteworthy that the
tape was not made in Idaho, but in Missouri. (See TT., p. 5543, L. 17 - p. 5544, L. 5.)
The instruction specifically requires to find that all the elements occurred in Idaho. If
some jurors understood "produce" to mean "to make," then the evidence does not support
the guilty verdict on this count. However, if other jurors defined "produce" as to give to
someone, it can be reasonably argued that the tape was given to someone in Idaho. This
difference is pertinent to a finding of guilt on this charge.
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Moreover, given the confusing and misleading nature of the instruction and the
trial court's refusal to clarify the requirements of this charge, it cannot be assumed that all
members of the jury convicted the defendant on this charge on the basis of the same facts
and elements.

Thus Shackelford's right to a unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by

Article III, section 2 and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been
violated.

v.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING

SHACKELFORD'S BRADY AND GIGLIO CLAIMS.
Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment;
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). Favorable evidence includes not only that evidence tending to exculpate
the accused, but also any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government's
witnesses, including impeachment evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972). The prosecution must actively search out material in its files and in the files of
related agencies reasonably expected to have possession of evidence favorable to an
accused. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
The State failed to disclose material which would have undermined the testimony
of Dr. Cihak. This evidence consists of peer review notes provided by Dr. John Howard
concerning Dr. Cihak's "guesstimate" of the time of death based on stomach contents.
(R. 31298, V. IX, Attachment B). Shackelford's post conviction counsel provided the

court with a letter from an expert, Dr. Paul Hermann, which questions the validity of
determining the time of death based upon the victim's stomach contents. (R. 31298, p.
3589).

Dr. Herrmann's review of the evidence in this case conflicts with the report and
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testimony of Dr. Cihak. Had the State disclosed this information to Mr. Shackelford or
had trial counsel adequately investigated the opinions of Dr. Cihak, there is a reasonable
probability that either Dr. Cihak's opinions would have been deemed inadmissible as
scientifically unreliable or, at a minimum, significantly undermined.
VI;

THE

DISTRICT

COURT

ERRED

IN

SUMMARlLY

DISMISSING

SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
CHOICE
The Latah County Sheriff Department seized almost five thousand dollars
($5,000.00) in cash from Mr. Shackelford at the time of his arrest. (Tr., 2/14/00, p.18,
Ls.3-11; p.19, Ls.16-21.) Following his arrest, Mr. Shackelford solicited at least four
private criminal defense lawyers for representation, including James Siebe, a criminal
defense attorney in northern Idaho with experience in death penalty cases. Letter, March
7, 2000 from James E. Siebe, attorney at law, addressed to Dale Shackelford. (See
Attachment AA.); (Tr., 2/15/00, p.31, 1.25 - p.32, 1.3.) Mr. Shackelford testified that
such money could have covered the expense of hiring a lawyer for his initial appearance.
(Tr., 2114/00, p.18, Ls.3-11.) Because the sheriffs department seized his money, Mr.
Shackelford could not hire a lawyer. (Tr., 2114/00, p.19, Ls.16-21.) Mr. Shackelford
testified that he possibly had the means to retain the services of a lawyer, but that he
could not determine that since his secretary had also been arrested. (Tr., 2/14/00, p.18,
Ls.14-20.) Mr. Shackelford also stated that he might be able to sell some of his vehicles
for additional money. (Tr., 2/14/00, p.19, Ls.8-10.) Such vehicles included his semitractors and trailers, as well as, box trucks.
The Court continued the initial appearance to the following morning to give
Mr. Shackelford "an opportunity to develop the information" that would enable him to
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determine whether he can retain counsel and for the State to justifY the seizure of
Mr. Shackelford's money. (Tr., 2/14/00, p.19, 1.22 - p.2l, 1.2; p.21, Ls;lO-17.)
Mr. Shackelford had other substantial assets as well, but was having difficulty accessing
them due to his incarceration and the fact that the Latah County attorney had contacted
the post office and his banks in Missouri. (Tr., 2/15/00, p.31, Ls.8-24.) Mr. Shackelford
requested the Court to release the five thousand dollars so that he could at least hire an
attorney. (Tr., 2115/00, p.3l, 1.25 - p.32, 1.3.) The State conceded that the money legally
belonged to Mr. Shackelford. The Court accordingly ordered the money to be released
from the Sheriff department; however, the Court ordered the money to be placed in an
interest-bearing bank account not accessible by Mr. Shackelford.
The Court initially requested the sheriff to make any resources available to assist
Mr. Shackelford in determining whether he could retain counsel but ultimately left it to
the sheriff to bring any problems to its attention. (Tr., 2/14/00, p.23, 1.22 - p.24, 1.7.)
Mr. Shackelford believed he still owned several vehicles that he could sell for money to
hire a lawyer, but because of his and others incarceration he could not verifY this
information. (Tr., 2/15100, p.32, 1.15 - p.33, 1.10.) The Court appointed Ray Barker and
Steve MahaffY to represent Mr. Shackelford and stated that to the extent that any other
financial resources are available to him, then those will go toward paying for
appointment of counsel fees. (Tr., 2/15/00, p.33, Ls.16-25.) Since the Court appointed
temporary counsel, it refused to make a ruling on the issue of Mr. Shackelford's
confiscated money (despite the fact that the court stated earlier that it was a temporary
appointment of counsel). (Tr., 2/15/00, p.35, Ls.2-II.)
At the arraignment, the State was willing to release the cash seized under the
assumption that the Court would apply that money against his attorney fees. (Tr.,
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2116/00, p.56, Ls.6-15.) The Court noted that Mr. Shackelford posted bond for John

Abitz in the amount of $25,000. (Tr., 2/16/00, p.57, Ls.7-23.)
A defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice is an essential component of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. (J 989).

It "stems from a defendant's right to decide what kind of defense he wishes to

present." United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1990). The qualified right
of choice of counsel applies only to persons who can afford to retain counsel. United
States v. Rewahl, 889 F .2d 836, 856 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the right to choice
of counsel is limited to defendants who can retain counsel); United States v. Ray, 731
F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 126 F.3d 1006 (7th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant had a due process right to a civil hearing wherein
he sought to obtain enough of his govermnent-seized assets to pay for his criminal
defense in the parallel criminal action and to pay for attorney efforts to free up those
assets.) The failure to allow a defendant to choose his own counsel violates the qualified
right to choice of counsel and constitutes prejudicial error per se. See Bland v. California
Dep 't of Corrections, 20 F 3d 1469, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1994).

VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
PETITIONERS CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL DUE TO LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
The district court found Ray Barker to qualify by experience as lead counsel and
Steve Mahaffy as co-counsel in a capital case. (Tr., 2116/00, p.42, Ls.I-8.) At the time of
his appointment to represent Shackelford in this case Mr. Barker was not on the Idaho
Supreme Court roster of attorneys qualified for appointment as lead counsel in death
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penalty cases pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3. Idaho Capital Defense Counsel
Roster, dated October 14, 2004. Trial counsels' lack of qualifications contributed to
violations of Mr. Shackelford's right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 5, 6,
and 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
VIII.

THE

DISTRICT

COURT

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WERE
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY IMPEACH STATE'S
WITNESSES.

PJ Baker, who lived in the Three Bear Road area, testified for the state that
Shackelford had asked him to provide Shackelford with an alibi. (Tr. p. 1916, Ls. 16-18)
Baker testified that this conversation occurred on May 28, 1999, the day before the
murders. Baker also testified that he also saw Shackelford the day after the fire, when he
confronted Shackelford with his belief that he thought Shackelford had "did it."
According to Baker, Shackelford did not respond to this accusation. (Tr. p. 1919, Ls. 915).
Baker admitted that he had not told investigators about these conversations with
Shackelford initially because Baker believed he had been wrongfully convicted by the
government. (Tr. p. Ls. 11-16). Baker, who was a convicted felon, was also concerned
because he had been handed a pistol by Brian Abitz on the night of the fire. (Tr.p. 1922,
Ls. 5-11). Baker testified under a grant of immunity from prosecution for any crime
stemming from his status as a convicted felon. (Tr. p. 1921-22, Ls. 24-25, 1)
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Trial counsel did not know about PJ Baker's record other than his latest felony
conviction related to a bombing. In fact, Baker had several prior felony convictions,
including assault on a federal officer.

Under I.C. §19-2514,

had PJ Baker been

convicted of just one more felony, then he would have faced a mandatory minimum of
five years up to life imprisonment.

Baker admitted to, at least temporarily, having

possession of the pistol on May 29, 1999. (Tr., p.I922, Ls.5-11.) Thus, another felony
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon would have constituted
powerful impeachment.
Baker was concerned enough about this fact that he withheld this information
initially from law enforcement and the grand jury, and only came forward after fearing
that his fingerprints might be identified on the gun. Further, he would only testify
regarding this information if granted immunity from any prosecution.
A reasonably competent attorney would have vigorously impeached Mr. Baker on
these matters.

Had a more vigorous impeachment been conducted, the jury would not

have believed Mr. Baker's testimony, and the result of Shackelford's trial would have
been different.
Counsel also failed to adequately impeach Baker's wife, Katherine Baker. There
were significant inconsistencies in Katherine Baker's testimony that went unnoticed by
trial counsel and thus unnoticed by the jury. Ms. Baker initially testified that Shackelford
came to her home on May 29, 1999. (Tr., p.l945, Ls.5-12.) This testimony was
inconsistent with her rebuttal testimony in which she stated that no one came to their
house on May 29, 1999. (Tr., p.5141, Ls.5-9.) However, in her initial statement to the
police, Ms. Baker did not state that Shackelford had come to their house that day.
Arguably Ms. Baker changed her testimony to support her husband's version, which was
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was that he did not see Shackelford until the day after the fire. This seems even more
likely when considering that in her subsequent rebuttal testimony, Ms. Baker, when
questioned regarding whether Bud Adamson came to her house on May 29, 1999, stated
that nobody came to their house that day. Trial counsel did not recognize that this
testimony was inconsistent with her earlier testimony.
Had a more vigorous cross examination been conducted of Kathernine Baker, the
jury would not have believed the testimony of PJ Baker and the outcome of
Shackelford's trial would have been different.

Shackelford has been deprived of his

right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
IX. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE IN
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY PREP ARE DEFENSE EXPERT WITNESSES.
Defense Arson Expert
Trial counsel failed to adequately prepare their arson expert, Don Perkins, to
testifY at trial. Trial counsel consulted with Don Perkins for the purpose of eliciting an
opinion whether the burning of the garage was arson. However, trial counsel did not
have Mr. Perkins investigate the fire scene until the evening before his testimony. Mr.
Perkins did not review any crime scene photographs until the day of his testimony.

Mr.

Perkins did not speak to trial counsel about his testimony until just hours before he
testified.
There were numerous deficiencies in Mr. Perkins' testimony and
investigation that were a direct result of inadequate preparation by counsel. In fact, trial
counsel only provided Mr. Perkins with the fire investigation report from the Lewiston
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Fire Department. (Tr., pA606, 1.23 - pA607, LA.)

Mr. Perkins, starting his

investigation in mid-November 2001, (Tr., p.4627, Ls.20-25.),

failed to review

Shackelford's statements or grand jury testimony, (Tr., pA606, Ls.12 - 22.), failed to
review pre-fire garage photos, (Tr., pA600, Ls.l8-21.), and failed to review the testimony
of the Deary firefighters. (Tr., pA607, Ls.20-21.)
Mr. Perkins conducted only three weeks of study on the fire, examining
the crime scene after dark the night before his testimony without a flashlight.

(Tr.,

pA589, Ls.l2-21.) He did not take any photos of the scene, take any documentation of

the scene or collect any evidence from the scene. (Tr., pA589, Ls.22 - pA590, 1.7.) Mr.
Perkins also did not interview anyone, including Mr. Shackelford. (Tr., pA589, 1.24
pA590,1.I.)
Because trial counsel failed to adequately prepare Mr. Perkins for his testimony,
Perkins' testimony was not helpful in rebutting the state's fire expert.

Had counsel

sufficiently prepared Mr. Perkins, the result of Shackelford's trial would have been
different. Trial counsel's failure in this regard fell below the standard of a reasonably
competent defense attorney and Shackelford was prejudiced as a result. Shackelford's
right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution has been violated.
Ballistics Expert.
Trial counsel consulted with Kay Sweeney regarding ballistics evidence.
Mr. Sweeney testified that the State's theory regarding the location of the shooter and the
victims was not valid. In support of this testimony, trial counsel sought to introduce an
exhibit

to reflect andlor illustrate Mr. Sweeney's opinions.

However, due to trial

counsel's failure to supply Mr. Sweeney with the necessary foundational support for this
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opinion, the exhibit was rejected and the force of Mr. Sweeney's testimony undermined.
(Tr. p. 4829, Ls. 5-25). Had trial counsel adequately prepared Mr. Sweeney and provided
him the necessary tools to support his opinion, then the jury would have known that the
State's theory was flawed. In a circumstantial case such as this, there is a reasonable
likelihood that but for trial counsels' deficient performance the outcome would have been
different.
X. CUMULATIVE ERROR
When there is an "accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial," the cumulative·
error doctrine requires a reversal of the conviction as the trial has contravened the
defendant's right to due process.

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87

(2007)(quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998».
Shackelford asserts that this is such a case. The errors as described above, should they be
found harmless by this court, have in the aggregate deprived Shackelford of due process
oflaw.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Dale Carter Shackelford respectully prays that
this Court reverse the judgment below and remand this case for a new trial, and for such
other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.
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